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ABSTRACT 
Philosophical Liberalism & 
The Nature of the Individual's Private Sphere of Rights. (April 2000) 
Joy Marie Brennan 
Department of Political Science 
Texas A&M University 
Fellows Advisor: Dr. Edward Portis 
Department of Political Science 
The complex system of rights we have in our society has its foundations in 
philosophical liberalism. This paper analyzes the sphere of individual rights, referred to 
as the private, within philosophical liberalism. The objectives of this paper are first, to 
determine whether there is a sacrosanct private within philosophical liberalism and 
second, to evaluate the concepts theorists give priority to over the private. A textual 
analysis of works by classical and contemporary liberal theorists (John Locke, John 
Stuart Mill, John Rawls, and Robert Nozick) provides the methodology for evaluating 
the objectives. This research provides clarity of the rights afforded to individuals within 
liberal theory and the validity of the label of philosophical liberalism as a theory that 
holds individual rights paramount. 
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Introduction 
In contemporary society we regard our rights as tangible products that can be 
called upon, referred to, and used as a shield. The view we have of rights has its basis in 
the assumptions of philosophical liberalism that individuals have a sphere of rights free 
from restraint or interference. Liberalism according to Ronald Beiner, "allows self- 
goveming individuals to coordinate their reciprocal relations in ways that maximize the 
attainment of their own individual purposes. " Philosophical liberalism is the study of 
tension between the maximization of rights and the regulation necessary to the 
functionality of rights by individuals. 
Within philosophical liberalism the private is the designation given to the 
individual's sphere of rights. This designation is reflective of the interaction between 
the individual and the state, or the private and the public. The private and the public are 
not terms easily explained by a definition because they offer instead a relationship. The 
boundaries of one create the boundaries of the other. At the heart of the research within 
this work is whether the private is defined by the boundaries of the public, or the public 
is defined by the boundaries of the private. This is not simply an argument of semantics, 
but a question of hierarchy and the placement of rights within society. Philosophical 
liberalism's coherence as a theory is based on the protection of the private. If the private 
is not sacrosanct then the viability of liberalism is called into question. An analysis of 
the nature of the private within philosophical liberalism is the focus of this paper. 
This thesis follows the style aod format of History of Poli ncai Thought. 
Evolution of Liberalism 
In analyzing the nature of the private within liberalism both classical and 
contemporary liberal theorists' works are significant. An understanding of the shift in 
liberal thought Irom classical liberalism to its present day form provides a Iramework for 
methodology. Classical liberalism can be characterized by its view of liberty and 
includes theorists such as John Locke and John Stuart Mill. Classical Liberalism can be 
viewed as unique because of the view that what is "best for all human beings is the 
magnitude of the measure of liberty which it accords its sane adult members. This form 
of polity uniquely grants them the liberty to do whatever they want provided no one but, 
at most, themselves is harmed by their doing it. "' 
Classical liberalism focuses on the inherent value of liberty and individualism 
and can be evaluated in terms of its "individualism with respect to ends" and 
"individualism with respect to means. "' The basic construction that follows from this is 
that the rational individual decides for him/herself on a conception of happiness or 
individual end and should be afforded the rights to pursue this end. 
This construction of liberalism is not without its faults or critics. Liberalism has 
been criticized as "a kind of caricatured runaway free market that secures liberty but in 
exchange fosters inequality and social injustice. " Because the American political 
framework was drawn from liberal theory some contemporary theorists blame liberal 
theory for the problems of American society and government. Contemporary liberal 
' Conway, Classical Liberalism: The Unvanquished/deat p. 5 
ibid, p. 6 
Benjamin, Barber, "An American Civic Forum Civil Society between Markm Individuals and the 
Political Community, " The Communitarian Challenge ra Liberalism, 1996. 
theorists have responded to this in different ways and are divided on this issue, but 
passionate nonetheless as Roberto Alejandro points out, 
In relation to the classical articulations of liberal theory, contemporary liberal theory 
represents an important shiA. . . It does not seek to actxtmmodate any more. . . in a 
nutshelL it seeks to force them to adopt a liberal vocabulary to frame the moral and 
political contlicts. ' 
Contemporary liberal theory can be viewed as a spectrum spanning from the 
right to the left. Right liberals, also viewed as neoclassical liberals, follow in the 
tradition of liberty and individualism and the "vision of self-government requires that the 
state intervene as little as possible in the social and economic life of the society. " Right 
liberal theorists include Robert Nozick and F. A. Hayek. Left liberals are those theorists 
that are trying to rectify the problems of associated with classical liberalism such as a 
social inequality. Left liberals prefer "considerable state intervention. . . in order to give 
each individual a fair opportunity to give play to his or her unique conception of his or 
her own personal good. " Left liberals include theorists such as John Rawls and Ronald 
Dworkin. 
The growth of liberalism to respond to criticism on social and communal issues 
has the added outcome of self-reflection where strong criticism and debate is internal to 
liberalism itself. Contemporarily, liberal theory has also been attacked externally by 
communitarian critics. Communitarian theorists are concerned with social and 
communal bonds and the detrimental effect liberal theory has had on the notion of 
' Alejandro, The Limits ofRtnrtsian Justice, p. 11 
' Ronald Beiner, "What Liberalism Mans, " The Communitarian Challenge to Liberalism, 1996. The 
notion of leA and right libemls was taken fmm Beiner's work. 
community and individual relations. The attention given to the internal debate within 
liberalism and external debate with communitarians has generated media coverage and a 
public arena for debate over liberalism. Articles on liberalism and conununitarianism 
have produced arhcles in Esquire, The Economist, and Harper 's Magazine — not the 
standard soapboxes of academia. All however still fall into the definition of liberalism 
offered at the beginning, because all are explicitly committed to the end of liberalism. 
The means that allow individuals to "maximize the attainment of their own individual 
purposes" is the main focal point of debate. 
Objectives & Methodology 
Within liberalism some social inequalities are allowable for the sake of 
preserving an individual's private sphere of rights. However if the individual's private 
sphere of rights is not inviolate within liberalism then the justification for allowing social 
inequality disappears and the legitimacy of liberalism becomes questionable. The 
objective of my research then is twofold. First, the question that arises from all of this is 
whether some private sphere of liberty is actually inviolate? The label of liberalism, if it 
implies anything, historically conveys the inviolate nature of the private. Determining 
whether there is a sacrosanct private within liberalism is the first objective of my 
research. My hypothesis is that there is not an inviolate private sphere, because liberal 
theorists do not uphold their own stipulated intellectual parameters of the individual's 
' For examples see "Freedom aod Community: The politics of restoration, ** The Economist, December 
24, 1995; aod "Philosopher Robert Nozick vs. Philosopher John Rawls: Give me Liberty or give me 
equality, " Esqvi re, March 1983. 
private sphere. If this is true then it raises the question: what is important enough to 
override the individual's established private sphere? 
The second objective of my research will be to explore this question and to 
articulate the principles that theorists give priority over their stipulated parameters of the 
private. If certain principles do consistently take priority over the private then the label 
of "liberalism" is called into question because its foundations are undermined. The 
justifications for allowing social inequality fall away and the legitimacy of liberalism 
becomes very weak. 
The methodology that will be employed is a close textual analysis of how the 
given theorists articulate the private sphere of rights, limitations imposed and theoretical 
problems that limit the protection of the private sphere of rights. A comprehensive 
analysis of liberalism requires inclusion of both classical and contemporary theorists. 
Works of John Locke, John Stuart Mill, John Rawls, and Robert Nozick were used for 
this purpose. Locke and Mill are both classical liberal theorists with distinct views of 
liberalism. The contemporary theorists Nozick and Rawls represent dichotomous 
perspectives on liberalism in present day political theory as Peter Singer writes, "there is 
a certain appropriateness in the fact that Nozick's chief opponent within this tradition is 
the American Philosopher, his Harvard colleague, John Rawls. " Nozick representing the 
right liberals, and Rawls representing the left liberals. These four theorists provide a 
framework for analyzing liberalism. 
" Singer, "The Right to be Rich or Poor, " Reading Nozick, p. 45 
The works that will be under consideration are John Locke's Second Treatise on 
Government, which presents Locke's contractual view of government. John Stuart 
Mill's On Liberty, along with Considerations on Representative Government and his 
Autobiography are all used to present a cohesive analysis of Mill's work. Nozick's 
Anarchy, State and Utopia, and The Nature of Rationality represent contemporary right 
liberal criticism and Rawl's Collected Paper 's, A Theory of Justice, and Political 
Liberalism represent contemporary lefi liberalism. 
The following four sections provide analysis structured according to each theorist 
and his respective works in chronological order beginning with Locke, then Mill„and 
into contemporary theory with Rawls, and finally Nozick. Within each section the 
sphere of rights will be discussed with a focus on particular issues significant within 
each theorist's work. 
John Locke 
The Second Treatise of Government is "a discourse concerning government" as 
Locke writes in the Preface. The tradition that Locke created continues to be reborn in 
contemporary theory. Liberalism in its current form has as its basis the theory of John 
Locke as Daniela Gobetti writes, 
The notion of the state as guardian and protector of each individual's private sphere, and 
as enforcer of nouns which neither the state nor the citizens may change justifies 
int rpreting Locke's political philosophy as the first expression of modern liberalism' 
The Second Treatise not only outlines government itself, but its formation, dissolution, 
and purpose. The social contract Locke presents in Second Treatise on Government 
provides both "individualism with respect to means" and "individualism with respect to 
ends" by maintaining the reciprocal relations of the individual and the government. 
Political Power 
At the beginning of the Second Treatise Locke offers his definition of political 
power. 9 
Political Power, then, l take to be a right of making laws with penalties of death, and 
consequently all less penalties, for the regulating and preserving of propeny, and of 
employing the force of the community, in the execution of such laws, and in the defence 
of tbe common-wealth fiom foreign injury; and aU this only for the public good. 
' Gobetti, Private and Pvbii c, p. 103 
Locke, Second Treatise of Governtnent, p, 8 
An explanation of this definition is not offered at this point. Locke moves from defining 
political power to showing its evolution, or how civil government obtains this power. 
To do this a pre-governmental state must be considered. This state is the "State of 
Nature. " Locke writes "To understand political power right, and derive it from its 
original, we must consider, what state all men are naturally in. " Locke uses the State of 
Nature as a tool for the establishment and ultimately, the transfer of rights from the 
individual to the government. 
The State of Nature 
The state of nature is characterized by a number of characteristics. This is a "state 
of perfect freedom" and "a state also of equality. " For Locke the absence of government 
is not necessarily an anarchic situation. Although no civil government is in affect the 
"law of nature" exists. " The implication is that while individuals have rights these 
rights are not limitless, or as Locke describes, 
But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of license. . . The state of nature 
has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, 
teaches all mankind. . . no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or 
possesslotls. 
The law of nature governs the state of nature, but the issue of enforcement now arises. 
In a state without a common authority or government enforcement is left to the 
individuals. Every individual "has a right to punish the transgessors of that law to such a 
ibitt. p. 9 
degree, as may hinder its violation. "" This is not an absolute power because Locke is 
careful to outline that an individual should only be punished for "restraint" or 
"reparation. "' 
The state of nature as now established is a state with liberty and equality, the law 
of nature, and an enforcement mechanism. With these provisions a motivation for 
entering civil society must be established. Locke creates an almost utopic state on the 
path towards civil government. Why would an individual leave the state of nature? In 
the state of nature a distinction between the private and public does not exist because 
there is no public. If the public helps define the limitations on the individuals private 
sphere of rights then that sphere is only limited by the law of nature. Why would the 
individual give up such a large sphere of rights? Locke derives the individual's reason 
for leaving the state of nature in several ways. 
The first reason for leaving the state of nature is based on the enforcement power 
granted to all persons in regard to the law of nature. Locke is pragmatic in his 
assessment of human nature, and the consequences of the enforcement of the law of 
nature when he writes, 
That in the state of nature every one bas the executive power of the law of nature, I 
doubt not but it will be objected, that it is unreasonable for men to be judges in their own 
cases, that self-love will make men partial to themselves and their friends: and on the 
other side, that ill nature, passion and nothing but confusion and disorder will follow, 
and that therefore God hath cenainly appointed government to restrain the partiality and 
violence of men. I easily grant, that civit government is the proper remedy for the 
"ibid. p. 9 
inconveniencies of the state of nature, which must certainly be great, where men may be 
judges in their own case. " 
The solution to this predicament is then provided in the form of civil government. 
In addition to problems of enforcement related to favoritism on the part of the 
individual Locke offers a harsher view of a non-governmental state to induce individuals 
into civil society. While the problems of the state of nature may not seem severe the 
situation could become a state of war. Locke distinguishes between the state of nature 
and the state of war writing, 
Men living together according to reason, without a common superior on earth, with 
authority to judge between them, is properly the state of nature. But force, or a declared 
design of force, upon the person of another, where there is no common superior on earth 
to appeal to for relief, is the state of war. 
The state of nature can become a state of war and in order to prevent the possibility of 
this descent civil society is additionally welcomed, or as Locke writes 'To avoid the 
state of war. . . is one great reason of men's putting themselves into society. " 
The motivation for individuals leaving the state of nature is established. Locke 
provides a mechanism for the establishment of government by consent. ' The nature of 
civil government and its power can now be discussed. 
"ibicl, p. 10 
" See Ruth Grant's lohn Locke's Liberalism, page 182, for an analysis of the individuals partiality to 
oneself and its implications. 
" ibid. , p. 13 
11 
Civil Government 
The previous discussion on the state of nature establishes the motivation for 
individuals entering into society. Several necessary conditions exist for the individual to 
enter into society. First, the individual can never be forced to enter into civil society. 
Consent is important element in this contractual theory and is the basis of civil society. 
Without consent a state of war is created that can lead to a "condition of slavery. "" The 
individual also "rational" and "grounded on his having reason. "' This may seem an 
obvious point, but in the latter part of the Second Treatise where problems between the 
individuals and the state are discussed Locke relies on assumptions he makes about a 
rational citizen to solve problems that may come up in civil society. 
The purpose of government within The Second Treatise is clearly to protect the 
individual's private sphere of rights as Locke writes, "the end of law is not to abolish or 
restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom. "' Later in Chapter nine titled Of the Ends 
of Political Society and Government Locke writes, "The great and chief end, therefore, 
of men's uniting into common-wealths, and putting themselves under government, is the 
preservation of their property. "' The "property" Locke is referring to is not limited to 
tangible items owned by the individual, but encompasses individuals' "lives, liberties, 
and estates. "' 
"ibid. 
, p. 17 
"ibid, pp 34-35 
"ibid, p 32 
ibid. , p 66 
' Disagreement egest over Locke's continuous use of the word "property" throughout the Second Treatise 
on Government. Further analysis of this issue can be found in C. B. Macpherson's The Political Theory of 
Possesidve Ind(v(dualism: Hobbes io l. ache. 
Three conditions must be met by civil society that are absent in the state of 
nature. The first condition is of "an established, settled, known law;" the second 
condition is "a known and indifferent judge;" and the third condition is a basic executive 
power to enforce the laws and punishments. For pragmatic reasons Locke rests this 
duty of preserving property on majority rule. The majority is not given arbitrary power 21 
however, and cannot usurp the individual's rights. 
The power that civil society, the majority as an extension and the government 
have is derived from a transfer of rights lrom what the individual gives up upon entering 
society. Locke writes that the power the individual gives up moves "into the hands of 
the society. " This power "can be no more than those persons had in a state of nature 
before they entered into society. " The stipulations given to rights in the state of nature 
can be understood in a larger perspective. Locke carefully delineates the rights the 
individual has and the rights not granted to the individual in the state of nature because 
of the eventual transfer of those rights. The rights within the state of nature are 
important because of their relationship to the rights present in society. This has 
important implications for the private. The government cannot overstep the rights 
provided which bear the limitations of the law of nature as outlined earlier within the 
state of nature section. 
Locke regards "the great instrument" for protecting the individual's interest in 
society as the legislature. Locke writes, "the first and fundamental positive law of all 
ibrd, , p 66 " ibid, pp. 52-53. See Chapter 8. 98 for practical purposes of majority rule. Locke includes health, 
business, and varying 'nterests. 
ibid. , p. 68 
13 
common-wealths is the establishing of the legislative power. " The obligations between 
the individuals in society and the legislature are reciprocal. The legislature is the 
supreme power governing society as long as it acts legitimately towards the end of 
protecting individuals' property. As long as the legislature acts consistent with this 
obligation the individual is obligated to obey the legislature. However, Locke qualifies 
this relationship with the provision that "the community perpetually retains a supreme 
power" against attempts to limit individuals' rights. " While the legislature is the 
supreme power it does not have the authority to take away individuals' property since 
the protection of property is the "end of governmen. " 
In addition to the legislature Locke provides for an executive power which 
would enact and enforce the laws. The executive is subordinate to the legislature and 
does not have the ability to prevent it &om meeting. There is a fine line between the 
fiduciary power the executive has to call and dismiss the legislature and the executive 
impeding the legislature from meeting. When the executive oversteps its bounds it then 
places itself in "a state of war with the people" and loses its authority and no longer is 
seen as a legitimate authority. The relationship between the executive and the 
legislature is effective, as Peter C. Meyers writes "the division of legislative and 
executive powers in Locke's constitution effects a balance not only of opposing passions 
' ibid, p. 70 " ibid. , p. 69 " ibid. , pp. 70 -73 " ibid. , p. 78 " ibid. , p. 73 
ibid. , p. 80 
but, more important, of science and art, of general and particular modes of reasoning. . . 
to harmonize the claims of the many and the few. " 
Two areas within Locke's Second Treatise on Government deserve special 
attention. The two chapters concerning the executive prerogative and the dissolution of 
government are important because of the potential ramifications to the individuals 
private sphere of rights. 
Prerogative 
Locke defines prerogative as the "power to act according to discretion, for the 
public good, without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even against it. '" This 
power is given to the executive to provide for unforeseeable circumstances. The 
prerogative gives the executive a great degree of power since this power is exercised at 
the discretion of the executive. ' The executive can have the power to override or 
supercede the law, pardon criminals, and govern concerning areas not covered by the 
law. Executive prerogative is a pragmatic allowance created to provide for numerous 
situations as Locke specifies, 
For since in some governmeats the lawmaking power is not always in being, and is 
usually too numerous, and so too slow, for the dispatch requisite to execution; and 
because it is nnpossible to forsee, and so by laws to provide for, aB accidents and 
necessities that may concern the public, or to make such laws as will do no harm, if they 
are executed with an inflexible rigour, on all occasions, and upon all persons that may 
' Meyers, Our Only Star and Compass: Locke and the Struggle for Poli lieut Rati anality, p. 224. 
Locke, Second Treatise of Government, p, 84 
" ibid. , p. 83 
come in iheir way' therefore there is a latitude left to the executive power, to do many 
things of choice which the laws do not prescribe. " 
While the reasoning Locke offers seem commonsensical the prerogative works as long 
as the executive is acting on behalf of communal good. 
Locke seems to suggest that whether the prerogative is advantageous or 
disadvantageous to society will be clear. But, Locke writes that the prerogative, when 
individuals feel the executive is acting on their behalf, is "never questioned. " This is 
important because it is not necessarily outside the realm of a rational individual to 
believe the executive is acting on behalf of the community when the executive is not. 
The prerogative by definition is used in ambiguous or ill-defined areas, and also areas 
not yet covered by the law. Criteria to evaluate the use of the prerogative are then 
vague. 
Locke attempts to side step this issue by relying on society to set the parameters 
of the executive prerogative. Prima facie, this seems to benefit the individual's private 
sphere because in this situation the private is dictating the extent of the public right. 
This occurs with the provision that the extension and use of the prerogative by the 
executive is understood by individuals in society. If the legitimacy of the use of 
prerogative power is sufficiently called into question then the mechanisms associated 
with the executive overstepping his/her power and the dissolution of government may be 
used. 
' ibid. , p. 84 
ibid. , pp. 84-84 
Dissolution of Government 
In order to protect the individual's private sphere of rights there must be a way to 
release oneself Irom the bonds of an illegitimate government. Locke provides for this in 
his chapter 'Of the Dissolution of Government. " Notice this chapter is called "Of the 
Dissolution of Government" and not "Of the Dissolution of Society" for a specific 
reason, because even if government is dissolved Locke maintains the individual is still 
bound to civil society to form a new government. " 
Locke outlines specific reasons for the dissolution of a government in situations 
where "there is no means for resolving this conflict within the framework of the original 
constitution. " If the legislature is altered or dissolved then the government is 
dissolved. The legislature is at the center of Locke's conception of government and 
without a legislature, or more specifically the legislature created by the commonwealth 
explicitly, the government should be dissolved. A number of situations arise that affect 
the legislature adversely that can lead to this situation. If the executive illegitimately 
extends his/her power then the legislature and its proper power is changed. The 
legislature is also altered if the executive prevents the legislature Irom meeting or alters 
elections. Also, if the government hands over control to a foreign power then the 
government should also be dissolved. The last condition for dissolving government 
concerns the negligence of the executive. If the executive acts irresponsibly and is so 
grossly negligent that the laws cannot be enforced then the government should be 
' ibicL, p. 107 The individual is not obligated to society in a situation of conquest. " Ashctatt, l, ocke 's Two Treaa'ses of Government, p. 196 
dissolved also. These are all issues internal to the infrastructure of the government that 
would lead to its dissolution. 
The second set of reasons for the dissolution of government stems from the 
relationship of the citizens to the government. If the government acts "contrary to their 
trust" then the citizens can legitimately dissolve the government. Locke specifies the 
actions that would meet this criterion as "whenever the legislators endeavor to take 
away, and destroy the property of the people, or to reduce them to slavery under 
arbitrary power. " If this happens then the government places itself "into a state of war 
with the people. " 
If a situation arises where the government is acting illegitimately then the 
citizens have justification for revolution. However, Locke qualifies this right with its 
pragmatic application by the people. Locke writes, 
Such revolutions happen not upon every little mismanagement in public afFairs. Great 
mistakes in the ruling part, many wrong and inconvenient laws, and all the slips of 
human frailty, will be born by the people without mutiny or murmur. But if a long train 
of abuses, prevarications and artifices, all tending the same way, make the design visible 
to the people. " 
Under this application of the right of the citizens to dissolve the government the private 
may be severely limited by the public. Locke, in order to create governmental stability 
places a de facto limitation on the private sphere of rights. 
' Ibid, pp. 107-110 
"ibid, p. 111 
"ibid. 
, p. 113 
Conclusion 
In essence, while Locke gives individuals the right to dissolve the government if 
rights are impaired he specifies that rights must be severely restricted over a long period 
of time for this right to be used. This does not adequately provide for the protection of 
the private from the public. If the public can expand and limit the private unjustly then 
rights are hampered because the threshold for when the expanding public's infringement 
on the private will result in action will come after the private has been encroached to a 
large extent over a long period of time. This does not provide adequate protection for 
the private from the public in this situation. 
However, Locke's contractual theory outlined in the Second Treatise on 
Government effectively creates and establishes a governmental entity designed to protect 
the individual's private sphere of rights. Problems occur if the government oversteps its 
bounds and the individuals must seek recourse. While, on a conceptual level 
infringement of rights will merit a response from the citizens to protect the private from 
the public pragmatically this only provides protection or response on the most severe 
level of rights infringement. Overall, Second Treatise on Government provides a 
balance of the tension between the public and the private, as Peter C. Meyers writes 
"Locke gets results to a degree that no political alternative, preinodern or modem, liberal 
or nonliberal, has equaled. " 
" Myers, Peter C. Our Only Star and Compass: Locke and the Struggle for Puli deal Rationality. p. x 
John Stuart Mill 
The liberal philosopher John Stuart Mill is both celebrated and criticized for his 
work On Liberty. Gertrude Himmelfarb, in her editor's introduction to On Liberty 
writes, "what John Stuart Mill, more than anyone else, bequeathed to us: the idea of the 
free and sovereign individual. " This idea is not a simple one. Mill was a prolific 
writer who covered the topic of liberty and government in a variety of texts creating a 
conception of the private and public, to borrow a phrase from Himmelfarb, that is both 
"notoriously complicated and devious. " Mill's discussion of the individual's private 
sphere of rights in On Liberty gave him "an intellectual authority" that he still carries 
from that work. 
However, Mill's other writings do not afFord individual liberty, or the private in 
this context, an equal amount of protection from the public. Mill neither protects 
"individualism with respect to ends" because of the priority he gives to individual 
development over the maximization of rights, nor "individualisin with respect to means" 
because he allows for rights to be trampled in order to reach the aforementioned end. 
This creates an atmosphere where the private can be subject to the encroachment of the 
public. The following analysis of Mill's works On Liberty, Considerations on 
Representative Government, and his Autobiography ofFered in a topical arrangement will 
support the above argument. 
" Mill, On Li berry, p. 8 
20 
The Harm Principle 
The thesis of On Liberty, commonly referred to the harm principle, is what is 
most recognized as Mill's philosophical legacy. An explanation of the harm principle is 
necessary to put into context the inconsistencies of Mill's work, Mill outlines the 
purpose of On Liberty in the following passage, 
The object of this essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern 
absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and 
control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties or the 
moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is that the sole end for which mankind 
are wananted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any 
of their number is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be 
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to 
prevent harm to others. " 
This statement seems to he an absolute defense of the private. Mill is offering a firm 
declaration concerning the individual's sphere of rights as Himmelfarb points out "the 
words attached to the individual are honorific. . . those describing society are generally 
pejorative. " In the introduction where this thesis is outlined Mill articulates that he is 
drawing a distinction between "the nature and limits of the power that can he 
legitimately exercised hy society over the individual. " Essentially, he is offering a 
delineation of the private and the public. 
What is considered part of the private is outlined hy Mill. The individual is free 
from interference on all issues "which affects only himself. " The individual also has 
" ibid. , p. 68 " Himmelfarb, On Liberty and Liberalism: The Case of John Stuart Mill, p. 15 
freedom of consciousness, "liberty of thought and feeling, " freedom of expression and 
the press, "treedom to unite, " and finally freedom for the individual to pursue his/her 
own plan in life. Mill spends the remainder of On Liberty further outlining the rights to 
which an individual is entitled. The inost important aspect of this designation of fieedom 
is not necessarily the rights contained within the framework of individual autonomy that 
Mill creates, but rather the commentary Mill provides on a government that does not 
allow these rights. Mill writes, 
No society in which these liberties are not, on the whole, ~ is free, whatever 
may be its form of government; and none is completely free in which they do not exist 
absolute and unqualifiecL 
Notice the use of the words "absolute" and "unqualified. " Mill places a high threshold 
for the protection of rights. Mill does not maintain this threshold himself with regard to 
governinent. Mill does believe in liberty and its protection, but only to such a high 
degree for a certain class of society. Mill's liberty is one based on elitism with a 
paternalistic view of government. 
Elitism and Liberty 
The first evidence of elitism within Mill's conception of liberty can be see in 
various sections of On Ltberry. On the page after outlining the harm principle Mill 
makes his first concession that, 
" ibisL, p. 59 
ibid. , p. 71 outlines all of these freedoms. 
' ibid. , p. 72 
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Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with aurbuiam, provided the 
end be their improvement and the means justified by actually effecting that end. 
Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when 
mankind have become capable of being improved by fiee and equal discussion. 
When Mill is referring to "barbarians" he is not speaking of early bc cultures or some 
group of humans on the evolutionary ladder, but rather refers to Akbar and Charlemagne 
who cover 700 ad and 1500 ad respectively. Was man not capable of "heing improved 
by free and equal discussion" at this time? It can also be argued that this provides a 
wide avenue for invading the private because as society evolves our conception of "free 
and equal discussion" changes and no society ever fully achieves that form. There is a 
circular provision for a government retaining despotic control. As long as the 
government continues to work towards this goal it may remain legitimately despotic. 
Mill's chapter "Of Individuality" presents another perspective on liberty. This 
chapter is reflective of the individual's freedom to pursue his/her own course in life as 
mentioned earlier. Tensions between the mediocrity of society and the geniuses are 
highlighted. Mill seems more concerned with providing freedom for those who seem 
capable of being more productive with their freedom stating, 
Persons of genius, it is true, are, and are always likely to be, a small minority; but in 
order to have them, it is necessary to preserve the soil in which they grow. Genius can 
only breathe freely in an atmosphere of freedom. 
Compare that statement to the following that, 
ibid. , p. 69 
'" ibid. , p. 69. See Mitt's footnote 5 on Akbar and Charlemagne. 
ibid. , p. 129 
In sober truth. . . the general tendency throughout the world is io render mediocrity the 
ascendant power among mankind. " 
This type of elitism may not seem to impact rights distribution within society, but 
consider the statement Mill makes that 'T'ersons of genius are, ex vi termini (by 
definition), more individual that any other people. "' The implications of this statement 
must be fully considered. If persons labeled "barbarians" are not entitled to freedom and 
there exists some group within society that are "more individual, " then does this entail a 
greater protection of rights or an elevated status? As persons continue along the 
spectrum of becoming more developed individuals it seems they are entitled to a greater 
private sphere. 
The linear relationship between Mill's view of development and liberty given to 
individuals' is more easily recognized in Considerations on Representative Government 
than in On Liberty. The two works are companionable in terms of Mill's theoretical 
development because of the close proximity of their being published, On Liberty was 
published in 1859 and Considerations on Representative Government was published in 
1861. The first chapter of Considerations titled "How Far a Matter of Choice" focuses 
on what types of individuals are entitled to liberty, and as an extension representative 
government. Mill outlines a number of conditions that make individuals "more or less 
unfit for liberty. " ' These conditions are not similar to the conditions outlined by Locke 
of youth or irrationality, but rather include conditions such as "indolence, or 
' ibid. , p. 131 
ibid. , p. 129 
' Mill, Considerot'tons on Representoti ve Government, p. 15 
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carelessness, or cowardice, " being a "rude people, " or even 'Nf they can be deluded by 
the artifices used to cheat them out of it. "' 
What can be inferred &om this is that if the government is able to take rights 
away from individuals through manipulation or other means, then those individuals were 
not entitled to their rights. This, instead of protecting the private provides a mechanism 
for the private to be co-opted by the public. Mill writes that for some conditions "a 
civilized government, to be really advantageous to them, will require to be in a 
considerable degree despotic. "" 
This is reflective of Mill's comment regarding barbarians, but to a larger degree. 
The Mill of the harm principle who espoused an absolute theory of liberty seems a far 
cry from the Mill here reducing the individuals entitled to rights to a minimum. Mill not 
only places conditions on liberty, but also qualifies liberty as not being a sufficient tool 
to influence the government. The next section will focus on Mill's focus on power over 
liberty and its detrimental affect on the private. 
Power and Influence 
If an individual does not meet one of the conditions that will make one "unfit for 
liberty, " then the individual has the challenge of exerting power of government to make 
sure that that their rights are not encroached. Mill writes about "active power, " that 
converts "itself into political power. " The individual having liberty is not enough to 
ensure a government that protects the private sphere but must also exert considerable 
"ibid. 
, p. 15 
"will" tothis end. Mill writes that, 
One person with a belief is a social power equal to ninety-nine whom have only 
interests. They who can succeed in creating a general persuasion that a certain form of 
gove~ or social fact of any kind, deserves to be preferred, have made nearly the 
most important step which can possibly be taken towards ranging the powers of society 
on its side. " 
This is a view concerned more with power than rights. Mill allows powerful 
groups to arrange governmental or social institutions in the manner they see fit 
with little regard to those who have only a "general persuasion. " This idea is 
articulated in his Autobiography where he writes "that government is always 
either in the hands, or passing into the hands, of whatever is the strongest power 
in society. " 
" ibict, p. 15 
ibid. , p. 23 
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Conclusion 
Despite the profession of Mill's harm principle his theory does not offer 
adequate defense to the private from the public as Roberto Alejandro points out, 
"provisos and qualification are also what defines Mill's arguments in On 
Li berrjt. His radical statements starts to be qualified as soon as Mill recovers his 
temper. " ' The elitism and paternalism of Mill's philosophy cannot be ignored. 
Mill gives priority to other areas ahead of rights, most notably development of 
the individual and power. These aspects of Mill's philosophy leads to a 
diminishing private. 
"Alejandro, The Limits ofRawlst'an Justice, p. 8 
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John Rawls 
The political theory of John Rawls is complex because of the shared emphasis of 
rights and equality, Rawls derives a conception of justice through a set of abstract 
inethods and refers to this as "justice as fairness. " Pragmatism is not Rawls' focus, but 
rather "to generalize and carry to a higher order of abstraction the traditional doctrine of 
the social contract. ' In understanding the interaction between the private and the 
public several areas of Rawls' theory must be analyzed. This section will focus on the 
basic philosophical elements of his theory and the parameters of the private. 
Articulating whether Rawls provides for "individualisin with respect to ends" and 
"individualism with respect to means" is difficult. Two ideas will be advanced. First, 
that the assumptions that Rawls makes in order to achieve his theory of justice do not 
respect individual rights. Secondly, this creates an arena where rights can be diminished 
in order to achieve equality. 
Two Principles of Justice 
The basis of Rawls philosophy is found in the two principles of justice that he 
uses as the foundation of government. Rawls writes, 
First: each person is to have an equal right io the most extensive scheme of equal basic 
liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others. Second: social and 
Rawls, d Theory of Justice, p. 10 
' Rawls, PoliticalLiberalism, p. xvii 
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economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to 
be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all. " 
Rawls also provides that "the first (be) given priority over the second. "' The first 
principle is well within the confines of liberalism. It outlines the basic parameters of the 
private and allows individualisin with respect to means and ends. The liberties that 
Rawls includes in the first principle are, 
Political liberty (the right to vote and hold public office) and freedom of speech and 
assembly, liberty of conscience and treedom of thought; freedom of the person; which 
includes freedom from psychological oppression and physical assatdt and 
dismemberment (integrity of the person); the right to hold personal property and 
freedom hum arbitrary anest and seizure as defmed by the concept of the rule of law. 
Understanding the parameters of the first principle is crucial to analyzing Rawls 
protection of the private. 
The second principle is not as clearly supportable within a liberal framework. 
The arrangement of economic inequalities occurs through a system of distributive justice 
that allows for economic redress. ' Distributive justice does not seek to create complete 
economic equality, but seeks instead to make sure that inequalities that do occur are not 
detrimental to the least advantaged. This is referred to as the difference principle. 
Rawls is concerned with the allocation of certain "primary goods" within society. 
While the difference principle inay be critiqued, and is even by Rawls himself, the focus 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 53 
Rawls, Political Liberalism, p 7 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 53 
" For a further explanation of distributive justice see Chapter 5 of A Theory of Justice, and Chapters Seven 
and Eight in John Rear lsi Collected Papers. 
A complete discussion of primary goods is provided in "Social Unity and Primary Goods" contained in 
John Rawlsi Collected Papers. 
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here will be how the principles of justice are obtained and the ramifications this has on 
the private. 
Original Position & The Veil of Ignorance 
Original Position is the initial situation of individuals from which the two 
principles of justice are agreed upon, or as Rawls writes, "the intuitive idea of justice as 
fairness is to think of the first principle of justice as themselves the object of an original 
agreement in a suitably defined situation. The original position provides the basis for 
the separation of the public and the private within Rawlsian justice. When Rawls 
outlines his theory concerning "justice as fairness" the importance of the original 
position is placed in context. Rawls contends that, 
My aim is to present a conception of justice which generalizes and cames to a higher 
level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contmct. . . the guiding idea is that the 
principles of justice for the basic structure of society are the object of the original 
agreement ' 
He uses it to construct his two principles of justice. Is this a valid construction? The 
following analysis will show that it is not, as Alejandro comments, "there is a sense of 
uneasiness in the original position arising Irom the reasonable suspicion that these 
nonmoral entities will probably fail in their attempt to agree on principles of justice. ' 
If the construction of the original position is not valid then the parameters created by 
Rawls are not legitimate. 
See introduction to Political liberalism 
Rawls, 3 Theory of Jusii ce, p. 102 
' ibid. , p. 10 
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Rawls elaborates several characteristics of the original position to have a 
"suitably defined situation. " First, the individuals are given a variety of options 
concerning conceptions of justice from which to choose. Even though this is an 
abstract situation Rawls does not allow an infinite array of conception to be sorted 
through because as he contends, "there is no assurance that the parties could make out 
the best option; the principles that would be the most preferred might be overlooked. ' 
In order for individual's to anive at the two principles that Rawls has designated they 
must choose from a list provided of "traditional" conceptions of justice as outlined by 
Rawls' theory. Rawls narrows the categories of justice to extrapolate his own particular 
end. The choice of the two principles of justice seems rather forced and contrived. 
Alejandro writes, "the natural sense of justice and the natural duty Rawls ascribes to his 
creature comes to the rescue of a project mired in a moral vacuum. ' Notice the choice 
of the "ascribes, " because that is exactly how Rawls reaches his two principles of 
justice. 
Rawls also places the individuals behind a theoretical "veil of ignorance. " The 
veil of ignorance is where individuals "do not know how the various alternatives will 
tdfect their own particular case and they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on the 
basis of general consideration. " What this entails is that no person 
knows his place in society, his class position or social status; nor does he know his 
fortune in distribution of natural assets and abilities. his inteBigence and strength, and 
Alejandro, The Limits ofRawlsian Justice, p. 37 " The list of conceptions of justice that Rawls considers can be found in A Theory of Justice page 107. 
ibid, p. 106 " Alejandro, The Limits of Rawlsian Justice, p. 38 
" ibid, p. 118 
the like. Nor, again, does anyone know his conception of the good, the particulars of his 
rational plan of life. 
Rawls uses the veil of ignorance to prevent to prevent personal favoritism and also 
allows for a conception of justice to be derived. Without the veil of ignorance and 
"these limitations on knowledge the bargaining problem of the original position would 
be hopelessly complicated. " ' While a conception of justice is arrived at the method 
does not allow any freedom of conscience. Alejandro illustrates this point writing, 
"Justice and the very nature of Rawlsian individuals are artificial creations: they are the 
end result of an agreement. " 
Conclusion 
Rawls considers the proper end of the initial position of individuals to be to 
arrive at a conception of justice and not to advance their own ends. While provisions are 
made aAer the fact in the principles of justice for the private to be preserved the method 
employed to arrive at the principles is corrupt. Rawls is not seeking to arrive at a 
consideration of individualism with respect to means and ends, but rather to "define the 
original position so we get the desired solution. " 
While other areas of Rawls' theory such as distributive justice or overlapping 
consensus could be addressed they do not stand independent of his analysis of the 
origination of the two principles of justice. ' Essential to liberal theory is the individual 
ibid. , p. 121 
" Atejandro, The Limits ofRawlnan Jusnce, p. 37 
ibid, p. 122 
' See introduction to Poliacal liberation. 
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having freedom with respect to the means and ends of his life. Rawls does not offer this. 
The original position denies the individual freedom with regard to ends because he/she 
cannot be aware of their particular ends in formulating a conception of justice. This is 
used to create a lack of freedom with respect to means because of the formulation of 
justice made. 
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Robert Nozick 
Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia can be viewed as a 
reactionary theory. Nozick does not simply offer reasoning for his "minimal state" 
theory, but rather seeks to prove that no other theory will suffice. In Nozick's theory the 
private defines the public almost exclusively, but with some serious ramifications. A 
result of this may be a deficient protection of individual rights that would hamper the 
private even though it is widely defined. 
The Minimal State 
Nozick's definition of the ideal government is offered in the preface to Anarchy, 
State, and Utopia. Understanding the end Nozick wants to amve at helps frame the 
philosophical considerations he is making. The basis of the minimal state is to be found 
in individual rights as Nozick maintains "individuals have rights, and there are things no 
person or group may do to them (without violating their rights). " From this Nozick 
derives a definition of the minimal state that, 
A minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theA, fiaud, 
enforcement of contracts, and so on, is justified; that any more extensive smte will 
violate persons' rights not to be forced to do cenain things, and is unjusiiiied; and that 
the minimal state is inspiring as well as right. 
Nozick provides several considerations in support of this theory of government that will 
be addresses in the following sections. The discussion of the state of nature (anarchy) 
Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, p. ix 
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and large government (the state) will not be addressed explicitly in that Nozick uses both 
to frame certain arguments in favor of the minimal state and to that end the two will be 
addressed in the following analysis. 
Invisible-Hand Explanations 
The creation of the state is not a sudden occurrence for Nozick Rom complete 
anarchy to an explicit and contractual government. Nozick contends that this process 
develops and is not simply an "intentional design. " There is a process of filtering and 
reaching equilibrium that creates an invisible-hand explanation. Nozick describes the 
phenomena of invisible-hand explanation that, 
show how some overall pattern or design, which one would have thought had to 
be produced by an individual's or group's successful attempt to realize the 
pattern, instead was produced and maintained by a process that in no way had the 
overall pattern or design "in mind. " 
Nozick trails through a series of associations short of being actual "states" in the process 
of the state being attained. " The invisible-hand explanation is significant to the private 
because of some of the implications that Nozick makes as a result. Nozick uses the 
invisible hand to move from the state of nature to the minimal state without intervention. 
This is important because it allows Nozick to "get from a state of nature to a minimal 
" ibict, p. 21 
" See Robert L. Holmes essay "Nozick on Anarchism" in Reading Nozi ck for a description of the 
movement trom the state of nature to the minimal state. 
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state without violating anyone's rights, so that there is no point at which anyone can 
claim that the state has assumed authority illegitimately. " 
This is further complicated by the inference that the individual is limited in 
avoiding the formation of the state and as a result can do little against the claim that "a 
state would arise &om a state of nature. " The state is an inevitable institution 
individuals are moving towards. The individual does maintain rights, however, 
especially over holdings and resources. Nozick does not allow the state to be any more 
"extensive" than the minimal state. ' 
Rights Protection 
Several ideas within Anarchy, State, and Utopia are important to understanding 
Nozick's conception of rights protection and the private. Nozick wants to create a social 
framework where the degree of rights given to the individual is large, but does not seem 
to provide adequately for the protection of these rights. His entitlement theory sets forth 
protection of individual holdings and resources, but not without complications. While 
his discussion of equality conveys the limitations of the minimal state with regards to 
rights. Nozick's last section on Utopia, further illustrates the ambiguity with regard to 
rights protection. 
Nozick's entitlement theory outlines the just acquiring, holding, and disposing of 
holdings in society. Nozick is not sure how to deal with the "rectification of injustice in 
' Singer, "The Right tobe Rich or Poor, " Reading iVozick, p. 39 
"ibid. 
, p. 131 
' ibid. , p. 149 
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holdings" creating an ambiguous policy regarding property. ' While he specifies the 
nature of "justice in holdings" writing, 
The theory of justice in holdings are that the holdings of a person are just if he is entitled 
to them by the principles of justice in acquisition and tmnsfer, or by the rectification of 
injustice (as specified by the first two principles). If each person's holdings are just, 
then the total set (distribution) of holdings is just. 
The "rectification of injustice" is not clearly provided for within Nozick's entitlement 
theory. Nozick is critical of distributive justice, but does not clearly outline how the 
entitlement theory will protect rights. 
Next attention can be given to Nozick's discussion of equality. Nozick is 
derogatory of the emphasis placed on equality in social institutions writing, "the 
legitimacy of altering social institutions to achieve greater of material condition is, 
though often assumed, rarely argued for. " Nozick uses his entitlement theory to limit 
the government's ability to afFect liberty. Mere inequality is not enough to warrant 
governmental interference. Only injustice in regard to holdings can give the government 
the right to interfere. A lack of equality of opportunity does not give the government 
the right to interfere in social institutions. 
Nozick is specific in that since inequality cannot be rectified without some 
redistribution, then it will cause rights violations because enforcement of equality of 
opportunity requires "a substructure of things and materials and actions. " The minimal 
state in leaving rights alone, is unable to provide that everyone in society will be able to 
" ibicL, p. 153 
ibicL, p. 232 
ibitL, p. 238 
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exercise or maximize their rights. Nozick seems to enlarge the private to such a degree 
that if problems occur within the private they are diAicult to rectify. 
Utopia is Nozick's solution to anarchy and the state. The utopia Nozick creates 
is best described as a number of smaller states that are each unique and provide the ideal 
form of government for the individuals within. Individuals choose when to enter into 
and when to leave a given society and the specific society chooses what individuals to 
accept. Through the filter and equilibriuin processes societies evolve to better serve 
individuals. Several issues emerge from this framework. First, these communities are 
not subject to the restrictions of the individual state. If the individual is unhappy then 
the individual may leave, or not choose to join specific communities. This creates a 
situation of flux that may lead to fragmentation that would endanger particular societies' 
ability to maintain the private and public sphere the individual wants. Peter Singer 
discusses issues that would develop in Nozick's '"meta-utopia. '" Communities that rely 
on members fulfilling specific roles would have trouble functioning if the make-up of 
their community changed. " 
ibicL, p. 311 
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Conclusion 
The theory espoused in Anarchy, Stare, and Utopia may be viewed as an 
example of the fears of the encroachment of the private by the public existing to such a 
degree that it binders society. Rights are separated and "protected" to the detriment of 
rights. The heart of Anarchy, State, and Utopia lies in its criticism of the state of nature 
and modern government, and not in properly clarifying the minimal state. Bernard 
Williams refers to this as the "minimally positive and the ambitiously negative. 
" 
Nozick now seems aware of the limitations of this philosophical perspective. In his 
latest book, The Examined Life, Nozick hints at the social limitations of such a view of 
rights as expressed through the minimal state, 
" See Peter Singer's essay "The Right to be Rich or Poor" in Reading Nori ck for s further explanation of 
the dependence of societies on members to maintain the social and political environment. 
Williams, *'The Minimal State, " Reading Nozick, p. 31 
See introduction to Nmick's The Kromi ned Life. 
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Results and Conclusions 
The results of the textual analysis of works by John Locke, John Stuart 
Mill, John Rawls, and Robert Nozick offer perspective on the notion of liberalism. The 
objectives of this paper were twofold. First, the question was presented as to whether the 
private was inviolate within liberalism. And the second objective was to explore and 
articulate the principles that theorists gave priority over their stipulated parameters of the 
private. Holistically the private is not inviolate and is evident through the conclusions 
drawn for each theorist. First, to evaluate Locke's contractual theory of liberalism offers 
the least internal validity problems. The Second Treatise of Government presents 
interaction between the individual and the state that is short, simplified, and to a degree 
ambiguous, but provides a rational and commonsensical approach in distinguishing 
between the private and the public. Locke is the most consistent of the liberal theorist 
analyzed. 
Nozick and Rawls each take the lockean perspective of government and try to 
conform it to their perspective concerns regarding the private and the public. Rawls 
wants a larger public to regulate the private to provide for rights and equality. Nozick 
wants a narrow public and large private to ensure rights are not usurped by government. 
Neither is successful in maintaining adequate boundaries of the public and private. 
Rawls conception of the original position is liinited to net the desired results he needs to 
frame his theory of "justice as fairness. " Nozick imposes such restrictions on the public 
within his theory of the minimal state that the private sphere may not be adequately 
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limited to provide rights maximization for individuals. In each case the private is not 
inviolate. 
Mill provides an additional perspective of a theorist with liberal elements, but 
with strong convictions that override liberal considerations or the protection of the 
private. The elitism of Mill's theory concerning the interaction between the individual 
and government only protects the rights of a few. This coupled with Mill's view of 
human development creates a justification for despotic rule over some people. The 
affect is an ambiguous private dependent on an individual's place within society that 
does not afford the individual adequate protection &om the public. 
The conclusion that can be drawn from this is that the private does not exist 
exclusive of the public within liberalism. Liberalism is not just concerned with the 
protection of rights, but the protection of rights within a social framework. Other 
priorities are taken into consideration with rights within a society. The balance of the 
tension between social priorities and individual rights is at the center of the tension 
between the public and the private. The convergence of the private and the public will 
continue to be an area of disagreement as evident by contemporary political theory. The 
tension between the private and public works to make sure one element does not 
encroach on the other. Attempts to reconcile the public and the private tend to give 
preeminence to one at the expense of the other. Perhaps the conflict between the public 
and the private is necessary in a dynamic social environment to allow for evolution of 
ideas and rights. 
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